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Grier: Monopolization Under Section Two of the Sherman Act

NOTES
MONOPOLIZATION UNDER SECTION 2
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
I.

IMTODUcmON

Section 21 of the Sherman Act proscribes three separate
offences: (1) monopolization, (2) attempts to monopolize, and
(3) combinations or conspiracies to monopolize. 2 This note will
deal generally with monopolization, sometimes called actual
monopolization.
The law of section 2 monopolization is extremely confused.
This confusion stems primarily from the existence of two competing theories regarding the nature of section 2 monopolization
-the power theory and the abuse theory. The power theory
regards the existence of monopoly power 3 as the essence of the
offense. Accordingly, a case of actual monopolization is made
out when the defendant 4 is shown to possess monopoly power.
He may escape Sherman Act liability only if he can show that
his monopoly power was inadvertently acquired. In contrast,
the abuse theory regards the abuse of monopoly power as the
essence of the offense. Accordingly, it is not enough to show
that the defendant possesses monopoly power; it must also be
shown that the defendant wrongly acquired or abused his
monopoly power.
These two conflicting theories of actual monopolization are in
part a reflection of a confusion that exists in the American
antitrust tradition. "We are not sure whether we are against
monopoly or the abuses of monopoly."' 5 There is a strong tradition in this country against monopoly" but there is an equally
strong tradition in favor of competition. It is felt that every
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).

2. Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y.

1969); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); 16 Vox KALINOwSxr, BusINss ORGANIZATIONs, ANTITRUST LAWS AmD TRADE REGULATION § 8.01 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS].
3. Monopoly power has been judicially defined as "the power to control
prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956),
4. Either an individual or a group of individuals acting in concert may be
found guilty of section 2 monopolization. 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 8.02
at 8-8. For a general discussion of the term person under section 2, see Id.

§ 7.02[1].

5. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. Cnr. L. R.v. 153 (1947).
6. Id.
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individual has a right to engage in business and this right
7
"might include the right to emerge as a monopolist ....
This confused tradition is embodied in the Sherman Act., The
framers of the Sherman Act, either intentionally or unintentionally, left the question open and the courts have oscillated
between the two extremes in applying the Act.
As a result, the Sherman Act has gone through various periods
of interpretation.9 Professor Edward. H. Levi, formerly of the
University of Chicago Law School, has said that "[f]or the
greater part of its history, the Sherman Act has as a practical
matter adhered to the abuse theory .

. . .,1

Professor Eugene

V. Rostow of the Yale Law School has suggested that the
Supreme Court adopted a power theory in a line of cases
starting with Standard Oil Co. v. United States1 and, as a
matter of strict holdings, has maintained this position since that
time. 12 Both men would agree that the Supreme Court endorsed
a power theory in American Tobacco Co. v. United States's when
it approved Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America.14 A reading of the relevant lower
court opinions since Alcoa, however, reveals that both theories
are still with us'5 and recent opinions of the Supreme Court
can be interpreted to support either theory.'"
7. Id. at 155.

8. Id. at 153.
9. See Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?,

43 ILL. L. REv. 745, 746 (1949).

10. Levi, supra note 5, at 157. Professor Levi points out that, theoretically,

it may not be true that the Supreme Court has for the most part adhered to
an abuse theory. The cases, which are distinguishable factually, are not clear
one way or the other, and it is possible to point to specific deviations from
the abuse theory. Until the mid 1940's, however, the Supreme Court opinions
were interpreted, either rightly or wrongly, by businessmen and others, to
stand for an abuse theory of section 2. Thus practically speaking, The Sherman Act for the most part has adhered to an abuse theory. Id. at 157-58.
11. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. Rostow, supra note 9, at 750-63. Professor Rostow points out, however,
that "the philosophy of decision in the majority opinions of [United States v.
United States Steel Co., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) and United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927)] is quite markedly different from
that in some, and perhaps all of the earlier cases." Id. at 758.
13. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
14. 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
15. Compare United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp.
41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (abuse theory) with United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), af-'d except as to
decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (power theory) and United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (power theory).
16. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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In order to minimize the confusion engendered by the existence
of these two theories, this note, after a historical presentation,
will attempt to analyze the substantive elements of actual monopolization from the standpoint of criminal law. Like other
crimes, those crimes proscribed by the Sherman Act 1 7 have

certain definitional elements, all of which must be proved in
order to make out a violation. Analytically speaking, every
crime has seven such definitional elements: (1) mens rea (the
definitional intent) (2) actus reus (the definitional conduct)
(3) causation (4) harm (5) concurrence of mens rea and actu
reus (6) legality and (7) punishment.' 8 No less is true for the
Sherman Act. The courts, however, have not been this formal.
The cases generally define section 2 monopolization in terms of
a combination of monopoly power and some form of conduct 9
or intent.20 The purpose of using a formal analysis here is not
to more accurately restate the substantive content of section 2
monopolization but, as previously mentioned, to minimize confusion.
II. THE RELATIoNsuip Bmrwimw §§ 1 AND 2.
The precise relationship between sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act has never been clear. 21 Section 1 declares illegal
"[e]very contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade ....
1122 Section 2 makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce .... ,,23 Although the two see17. Both section 1 and section 2 are misdemeanors. Only the Government

can assert criminal liability under these sections. 16

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

§ 7.01, at 7-1 n.1. Civil liability, however, may be imposed either by the

Government or a private citizen who has been injured under the terms of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15, 26 (1964).
18. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1960);
Mueller, Foreword to J. HALL & G. MUELLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
at v (2d ed. 1965).
19. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp.
41 (D. Del. 1953), affd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
21. Handler, Nineteenth Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments
-1966, 21 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 539, 554 (1966). For a general discussion of
the relationship between sections 1 and 2, see 16 BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS
§ 7.01[2].
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
23. Id. § 2. The original Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, was passed in
1890. Both sections 1 and 2 were amended in 1955 to increase the maximum
fines for violations from $5,000 to $50,000. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69
Stat. 282. Section 1 was amended in 1937 by the Miller-Tydings Act to
exempt contracts made pursuant to fair trade laws from the operation of that
section. Ch. 690, 50 Stat 693.
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tions obviously define separate offenses, there is some overlap
between the scope of each section 24 and the problems arising
under both sections are similar. 25

Professor Milton Handler

of the Columbia University Law School summed up the practical
relationship between the two sections when he said that "[m]ost
Sherman Act litigation arises under Section 1, with a Section 2
charge thrown in as mere makeweight." 26 But whatever the

relationship between the two sections, the cases decided under
one section influence the development of the law under the
2 7

other.

The early cases viewed the Sherman Act as a unit aimed at
restraints of trade in general. 28 Contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade and monopolies were all looked
upon as unlawful restraints. In time, however, the courts
developed a separate substantive content for each section2 9 and
specialization developed within each section s°
IMI. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ANVD THE
INfPORTANCE OF THE OASES

At one time it was generally felt that Congress had intended
the Sherman Act as a codification of the 1890 common law dealing with unlawful restraints of trade.31 Section 1 of the Sherman
24. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940);
BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 7.01[2], at 7-19.
25. Rostow, supra note 9, at 746.
26. Handler, supra note 21, at 554.

16

27. Rostow, supra note 9, at 746. For an example of the impact of section 1
law on the resolution of a section 2 issue, see the discussion of section 1 in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
28. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Chief Justice
White fused sections 1 and 2 together. He "treated these two sections as
essentially synonymous, both being directed against unreasonable restraints of
trade, but with Section 2 having a somewhat broader application." 16 BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS

701[2], at 7-18 (footnotes omitted). In speaking of the

history of unlawful restraints, he said: "[M]onopoly and the acts which produce the same result as monopoly, that is, an undue restraint of the course of
trade, all came to be spoken of as, and to be indeed synonymous with, restraint
of trade." 221 U.S. at 54.
This "concept of an all-inclusive Sherman Act" apparently existed prior to
the Standard Oil decision. See Rostow, supra note 9, at 751.
29. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940).
30. Today section 2 is recognized to proscribe three separate and distinct
offenses, note 2 supra, and under section 1, the courts are beginning to
develop a law of combinations separate and distinct from the law of contracts
and conspiracies. For a discussion of this development, see Underwood, Combinations in Restraint of Trade: Are They No Longer Synonymotu with
Conspiracies?, 18 J. Pun. L. 135 (1969).
31. See 16 BUsIxNss ORGANIZATIONS § 1.01[2].
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Act "employs terms known to the common law"8 2 and several
statements in the legislative history of the Act support this
conclusion. The legislative history is conflicting, however, and
susceptible of more than one interpretation.8 3 Moreover, the
substantive content of the Sherman Act has been judicially
expanded beyond the scope of the common law that existed in
4

1890.3

Professor Phillip Areeda of the Harvard Law School has
suggested that, because the "legislative history is so lacking in
careful weighing or deliberate choices," 35 the Sherman Act
might best be viewed as an invitation to the federal judiciary to
develop a federal common law of monopoly and unlawful restraints.8 6 Professor Areeda's suggestion is logical, and it finds
support in the legislative history of the Sherman Act.8 7 It is

also appealing because it emphasizes the importance of the cases
in dealing with questions arising under the Sherman Act.
Because of the broad wording of the Sherman Act and its
virtual immunity from drastic amendment or repeal, 38 a common law approach is more appropriate, from the standpoint of
legal method, when dealing with Sherman Act questions. Although legislative history may be persuasive in a given case,
much of the substantive content of the Sherman Act has been
created and developed by the courts in a traditional common
law fashion. Thus, as a practical matter, the courts are less
hampered by traditional concerns of statutory interpretation in
32. P. AREEDA,
33. Id. at 23.

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

22 (1967).

34. 16 BusiNEsS ORGANrZATIONS § 1.01[2], at 1-6, 1-7; see United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
35. P. AREEDA, supra note 32, at 23.
36. Id. at 24, 23. Professor Areeda seems to suggest that the Sherman Act
is purely jurisdictional in that it is not "a prohibition of any specific conduct."
Id. at 23. Such an interpretation could, at least theoretically, raise constitutional problems. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Textile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Moreover, the language of the Act seems to be directed at specific types of
conduct. But the language is broad and neither the Act nor the legislative
history set forth any definite legislative policy. Thus, although it appears substantive in form, the Sherman Act, because of its breadth and lack of direction, might best be described as a jurisdictional statute.
37. "When Senator Hoar was asked why Congress should bother to denounce monopoly, if it were already prohibited at common law he replied:
'Because there is not any common law of the United States'." Id. at 23.
38. The material language of the Sherman Act has remained virtually
unchanged since 1890. See discussion note 23 supra. Moreover, the consensus
of opinion seems to be that the Sherman Act has become a fundamental
element of the American political tradition and is consequently immune from
repeal or drastic modification. See Levi, supra note 5, at 156; Rostow, supra
note 9, at 750.
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dealing with the Sherman Act; courts traditionally have been
more willing to expand and contract legal doctrines of their own
creation.
Antitrust cases are noted for their ambiguity, however, and
most of the significant cases are subject to more than one interpretation. Moreover, technical distinctions between holding
and dictum are not as important in antitrust litigation as in
other areas of the law. 39 What is more important is the philosophy of a particular court at a given time. The legal technician
should remember that "in connection with the Sherman Act,
it is delusive to treat opinions written by different judges at
different times as pieces of a jig-saw puzzle which can be, by
effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern."40
IV. ILSTOWCAL PPSENTATION

a. The Early Cases
In United States v. Trans-MissouriFreight Assooiatio 4 1 the
Court held that section 1 condemned all restraints of trade with
no exceptions. Subsequently, however, the Court retreated from
this absolutist position and said "that the statute applies only
to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce .

.

.

;1142

restraints that were

lawful at common law, or at least some of them, were not considered to be unlawful under the Sherman Act.4 3
b. The Rule of Reason
The modern history of section 2 monopolization begins with
39. The spirit of an antitrust opinion is significant because only a limited
number of suits can be brought and of these, only a select few will ever reach
the Supreme Court. Dictum in antitrust opinions often has a dramatic effect on
industrial development and future prosecutions under the Sherman Act. Levi,
.supra note 5, at 158. The cases of United States v. United States Steel Co.,
251 U.S. 417 (1920) and United States v. International Harvester Co., 274
U.S. 693 (1927), although they can be distinguished on the ground that the
defendants did not possess monopoly power, Rostow, supra note 9, at 759, set
off a wave of industrial mergers and "affixed the abuse theory on the Sherman Act." Levi, supra note 5, at 159. Moreover, the Steel "decision caused the
government to abandon other cases against big business." D. WATSON, Ecoxomic PoLIcY 269 (1960). In both cases the Court said that mere size does
not violate the Sherman Act. "The same, or a similar, view is still widely
held," Id., although it is not clear whether the notion of mere size is synonymous with monopoly power.
40. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342
(D. Mass 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
41. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
42. United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
43. See id. at 567-68; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), a'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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the case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 44 which announced
the rule of reason. 45 The rule of reason expressed the philosophy
of Chief Justice White that the Sherman Act was not intended
to reach every restraint of trade but only those restraints that, in
view of all the circumstances, appeared unreasonable to the
court.4 6 The defendant's conduct and intent were, of course, appropriate circumstances to be considered; however, "resort to
the rule of reason was not permissible in order to allow that to
be done which the statute prohibited. '47 Thus if a defendant
were found to possess a certain degree of market dominance, he
would be conclusively presumed to have monopolized within the
meaning of section 2 without regard to his intent.48 The question of the defendant's intent became important only when the
prohibited degree of economic dominance was lacking.
This view--"that the acquisition of a certain degree of economic power was in itself a violation of Section 2 and Section 1,
without particular evidence of how the power had been acquired
or exercised" 149-prevailed until 1920 when the case of United
States v. United States Steel Corp.0 was decided.
o. The Abuse Heritage-The Steel and Harvester Cases
In the Steel case, the Supreme Court said: "[T]he law does
not make mere size an offense, or the existence of unexerted
power an offense. It, we repeat, requires overt acts .... ,,51
This statement was reiterated in United States v. International
Harvester 00.5 2 and only slightly weakened in United States v.
Swift & Go.5a where Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "Mere size . ..
44. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

45. TE ATTORNEY GFxmER's NATioNAL CoMMIra
(1955).

To STUmY THE ANTI-

TRUST LAws, REPORT 5

46. 221 U.S. at 60, 64, 65; Rostow, supra note 9, at 751.

47. 221 U.S. at 64, 65.
48. Rostow, supra note 9, at 755. Chief Justice White viewed monopoly as
a species of unlawful restraint. Note 28 supra. Where a restraint was of such
a nature that it clearly constituted an unlawful restraint, then resort to the
rule of reason was not permissible. 221 U.S. at 65. This line of reasoning,

which was developed and refined in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927)

and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.

150 (1940), forms the basis of the modern day concept of per se illegality.
Rostow, supra note 9, at 755.
49. Rostow, mupra note 9, at 756. But see United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954). "[Mr. Justice White's] opinions encouraged the view that

there was no monopolization unless defendant had resorted to predatory practices." Id.
50. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
51. Id. at 451.
52. 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
53. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to
the point... [of] monopoly."5 4
Although the Steet and Harvester cases can be distinguished
factually, 5 they signaled a shift in the philosophy of the Supreme Court towards an abuse theory of Section 2.r 6
d. The Power Heritage-The AZcoa Case
The philosophy of the Court shifted back towards a power
theory in 1946 when it endorsed 57 the opinion of Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,5" the leading case on Sherman Act monopolization.
In that case, Judge Hand synthesized the law of actual
54. Id. at 116.
55. Professor Rostow feels that it is significant that the defendants in both
cases lacked monopoly power.
[T]he decisions themselves, whatever their effect on public and
legal opinion, do not support their doctrine ....

[I]n the Steel

case the determinative fact, the court said, was that the company
had not in its opinion achieved monopoly power, having only 50%
of capacity, and had given up the attempt to achieve monopoly
power in view of the forces of resistance it met in the market....
Similarly, in the Harvester case . .. [the defendant's] share of
the . . . market had dropped . . . to 64% or less .

.

..

[T]he

court concluded, International had lost both the power and the
purpose to dominate the market.
Rostow, supra note 9, at 759. From the standpoint of economics, however, the
two defendants probably did possess monopoly power.
With few exceptions .

.

. economists disagree that size is of no

consequence in determining the level and pattern of prices in an
oligopolistic industry. A firm with half the output of an industry
can behave as if it had a complete monopoly, when it can be certain that its smaller competitors will follow its prices. Size, then,
usually means oligopoly, and price leadership. Oligopoly can be,
and price leadership by a dominant seller undoubtedly is, incompatible with workable competition.
D. WATSON, EcoNoMIc PoLicy 269 (1960).
56. Levi, supra note 5, at 159.
57. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 812-14 (1946).
Although Judge Hand's opinion is subject to more than one interpretation, the
consensus of opinion seems to favor a power theory interpretation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, (D.R.I. 1964), af 'd except
as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af 'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 340-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 8.02[4], at 8-60, 8-62; Levi,
supra note 5, at 174. 175; Rostow, supra note 9, at 762, 763. The contrary
position is suggested in a number of cases. E.g., United States v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 216, 217 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S.

377 (1956).

58. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The case, pursuant to a newly adopted
statute, Act of June 9, 1944, ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2109
(1964)), was heard by a special circuit court in lieu of the Supreme Court,
which lacked the necessary quorum to hear the case because four Justices had
disqualified themselves. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
812 & n.10 (1946) ; P. AREEDA, supra note 32, at 77, 78.
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monopolization into a power theory with an exception in favor
of the inadvertent monopolist. He rejected the abuse philosophy
of Steel and Harvester after an examination of the recent developments under section 1 convinced him that possession of
monopoly power was the real offense under section 2. The
Supreme Court had held in United States v. Trenton Potteries
Go.60 that uniform price-fixing was illegal without regard to
the reasonableness of the prices charged, where the price-fixers
substantially controlled the market. This rule was broadened
in United States v. Socony-7acuum Oil Co.60 where the Court
said that "any combination which tampers with the price
structure is [per se illegal]". 61 Since a monopolist by definition
has the power to control prices and, in effect, tampers with the
price mechanism just by doing business, it followed that monopoly power without more was unlawful. As Judge Hand put it:
Starting . . . with the authoritative premise that all

contracts fixing prices are unconditionally prohibited,
the only possible difference between them and a monopoly is that while a monopoly necessarily involves an
equal, or even greater, power to fix prices, its mere
existence might be thought not to constitute an exercise
of that power. That distinction is nevertheless purely
formal; it would be valid only so long as the monopoly
remained wholly inert; it would disappear as soon as
the monopoly began to operate; for when it did-that
is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it must sell at some
price and the only price at which it could sell is a price
which it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its
exercise must needs coalesce. Indeed it would be absurd
to condemn such contracts unconditionally, and not to
extend the condemnation to monopolies; for the contracts are only steps toward that entire control which
monopoly confers; they are really partial monopolies. 62
After defining the relevant market as domestic and imported
virgin aluminum ingot, Judge Hand found, as a matter of fact,
that Alcoa dominated 90 per cent of this market and he concluded that such a dominance constituted a monopoly. But it
did not necessarily follow that Alcoa was guilty of section 2
monopolization; Alcoa might have inadvertently acquired its
59.
60.
61.
62.

273 U.S. 392 (1927).
310 U.S. 150 (1940.
Id. at 221, 223.
148 F.2d at 427-28.
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monopoly power "automatically so to say: that is, without
having intended either to put an end to existing competition, or
to prevent competition from arising when none had existed; [it]
may [have] become [a monopolist] by force of accident.163 Judge
Hand reasoned that, since monopolization is "a crime, as well as
a civil wrong, it would be not only unfair, but presumably contrary to the intent of Congress, to include such instances."6 4
The prior cases, recognizing but not fully articulating this
problem of the inadvertent monopolist, had "from the very outset... at least kept in reserve the possibility that the origin of
6
a monopoly [might] be critical in determining its legality .... )
This notion was expressed by the courts in different ways but it
was usually "expressed by saying that size [alone] does not determine guilt; '66 there must be size plus something else, such as
exclusion of competitors, unnatural growth, wrongful intent, or
unduly coercive means. But to Judge Hand, who clearly saw
the reasons for "these compunctions," there was only one question: "Whether [the defendant] falls within the exception
established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid,
the control of a market.167 He concluded that Alcoa did not
qualify for the exception because, inter alia, it had excluded
competitors by constantly expanding its capacity to gobble up
any increases in demand. In Judge Hand's words:
It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate
increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to
supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling
and redoubling its capacity before others entered the
field. It insists that it never excluded competitors; but
we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it
opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
already geared into a great organization, having the
advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite
of personnel. Only in case we interpret "exclusion" as
limited to manoeuvres not honestly industrial, but
actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can
such a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not
"exclusionary." So to limit it would in our judgment
63. Id. at 429-30.
64. Id. at 430.
65. Id. at 429.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 431.
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emasculate the Act; would permit just such consolidations as it was designed to prevent. 68
Judge Hand gave three examples where monopoly power

might inadvertently be acquired:
[1] A market may, for example, be so limited that it is
impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand. [2] Or there may be changes in taste or
in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. [3] A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior
skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong
argument can be made that.., the Act does not mean
to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it
is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins.6 9
Judge Hand's first example describes an economic phenomenon
commonly called a natural monopoly. 70 His third example de68. Id.
69. Id. at 430.
70. The tcrm natural monopoly was broadly defined in C.

KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959) as
follows:
In the economic sense, natural monopoly is monopoly resulting
from economies of scale, a relationship between the size of the
market and the size of the most efficient firm such that one firm
of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can take
at a remunerative price, and can continually expand its capacity at
less cost than that of a new firm entering the business. In this
situation, competition may exist for a time but only until bankruptcy or merger leaves the field to one firm; in a meaningful
sense, competition here is self-destructive.
As noted economies of scale is a relative concept. Natural
monopoly may exist in a market as large as the entire country, as
seems probably the case in the telephone industry.
Id. at 191. Likewise, in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), the
concept of the natural monopoly market was referred to in terms of economies
of scale. Id. at 343. The concept was also expanded to include within the
natural monopoly exception monopoly power resulting from "natural advantages, (including accessibility to raw materials or markets) ... ." Id. at 342
(dictum)
The defense of natural monopoly frequently reoccurs in the cases and is
sometimes successful. American Football League v. National Football League,
323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963), affg 205 F. Supp 60 (D. Md. 1962) (defendant, the first competitor to enter the field, acquired natual monopolies in
several major cities; held no violation of section 2 monopolization) ; Union
Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960)
(a city that, by reason of its size, could not support two good daily newspapers described as a natural monopoly); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit &
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scribes a successful competitor who succeeds "by virtue of his
superior skill, foresight and industry" 71 and his second example
Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F2d 484 (lst Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817
(1952) (the advantageous location of defendant's building resulted in a natural
monopoly); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (where the relevant market was defined as a particular type
of squad radio, which was the subject matter of a United States Army contract, the defendant acquired a natural monopoly by virtue of his low bid);
United States v. Harte-Hawks Newspapers, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Tex.
1959) (a town of 17,000 was said to constitute a natural monopoly because it
could not profitably support two daily newspapers and the purchase by one
paper of the other did not violate antitrust laws) ; United States v. Guerlain,
Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958) (defendants were said to possess a natural monopoly where the relevant market
was "defined as the trade-marked toilet goods of each defendant"). See John
Wright & Associates, Inc. v. Ullrich, 328 F2d 474 (8th Cir. 1964) (the
defendant accidentally acquired the only theater in a small town when its only
rival went out of business).
The natural monopolist is not precluded from competing fairly to maintain
his monopoly, American Football League v. National Football League, 223
F2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963), and "a natural monopoly market does not of itself
impose restrictions on one who actively, but fairly, competes for it, anymore
than it does on one who passively acquires it." Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960) (dictum);
Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The
natural monopolist is given more latitude under the antitrust laws, Ovitron
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); however,
if the natural monopolist abuses his monopoly power, he may be found guilty
of actual monopolization. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg.,
Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) ; United
States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S.
915 (1958). Indeed, any "use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired,
to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
competitor, is unlawful." United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
For a discussion of the judicial regulation of lawful monopoly power, see
Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUm. L. REV. 930,
935-37 (1962).
71. 148 F.2d at 430. This concept of the superior successful competitor is
discussed at length in the text In United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), a!f'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954), Judge Wyzanski translated Judge Hand's general statement into
specific examples: "superior products ....
economic or technological efficiency, (including scientific research), [and] low margins of profit maintained
permanently and without discrimination . .. ." Id. at 342. This concept has
also been expressed by using the term business acumen. United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). Other specific examples that have
been given to illustrate Judge Hand's general statement include "superior
management" and "normal business practices and competitive activity." 16a
BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9.03[11], at 9-45, 9-47. See, e.g., Clark Marine
Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 345
F2d 79 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
For examples of cases where a defendant successfully withstood a charge of
actual monopolization on the grounds, inter alia, of a superior product or
service see the cases of Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924 (10th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955) ; Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental
Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964) (semble); Clark Marine
Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 345
F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966) ; United States v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351
U.S. 377 (1956).,
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is seemingly a species of the third, in that a shift in consumer
taste or a change in cost would normally be the result of superior
skill, foresight and industry.7 2 In Judge Hand's view, both the
superior successful competitor (i.e., the competitor who succeeds
by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry) and the
natural monopolist were inadvertent monopolists; both were
the inevitable result of the automatic operation of natural forces
in the market place, which the Sherman Act was designed to
protect. The superior successful competitor was characterized
as "the passive beneficiary of a monopoly, following upon an
involuntary elimination of competitors by automatically opera73
tive economic forces."
Strangely enough, however, Judge Hand's statements about
the superior successful competitor are seemingly inconsistent
with his actual decision in the case. Alcoa's practice of anticipating increases in demand with additional capacity, although
characterized as honestly industrial, was found to constitute
exclusionary conduct. But such conduct arguably was nothing
more than the exercise of superior foresight. Indeed, Alcoa
alleged its ability to stimulate new demand as evidence of its
superior skill.74 But anticipation of demand was not the type
of superior foresight Judge Hand had in mind. In analyzing
monopolization, he started with the proposition that monopoly
was socially harmful 5 and should not be tolerated except under
72. Arguably, however, a shift in consumer taste or cost could occur independently of the defendant's superior skill, foresight and industry. Perhaps this

idea is included in the term historic accident that was used by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
Although subsequent cases have added to Judge Hand's list of examples, all
of these subsequent additions can usually be characterized under either of the
two categories of inadvertent monopoly implicit in Judge Hand's analysis:
natural monopoly or superior successful competitor. Thus the example suggested by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781 (1946)-where the defendant makes "a new discovery or an original
entry into a new field", Id. at 786--can be characterized as an example of
superior judgment. But see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966) (historic accident).
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), Judge Wyzanski listed a
third category of legally exempt monopoly-legally licensed monopoly-which
has always been an implicit exception to the antitrust laws for obvious reasons. See generally 16a Busx-_ss ORGANIZATIONS § 9.03[2].
73. 148 F.2d at 430.

74. Id.

75. Id. at 428-29.
We may start therefore with the premise that to have combined
ninety per cent of the producers of ingot would have been to
"monopolize" the ingot market; and, so far as concerns the public
interest, it can make no difference whether an existing competition
is put an end to, or whether prospective competition is prevented.
Id. at 429. Judge Hand described the vice of monopoly as "the denial to commerce of the supposed protection of competition." Id. at 428.
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certain limited circumstances where it resulted automatically
from natural economic phenomena. Where, for example, the
defendant acquired or maintained monopoly power by virtue of
his superior product or service, his monopoly resulted from the
operation of the market place; individual consumers, acting in
concert and recognizing the superior quality of his product or
service, rewarded him with monopoly. But where the defendant
acquired or maintained his monopoly power by simply overwhehning his actual or potential competitors with increases in
capacity, his monopoly could not be said to be the result of the
operation of the market place; the actions of individual consumers had nothing to do with the defendant's acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly. His monopoly was the direct result
of his business policies and thus, it could not be said to be
economically inevitable.78
e. Beyond Alcoa-The Subseguent Cases
Subsequent cases refined Judge Hand's treatment of the
inadvertent monopolist into what is commonly called the thrustupon defense or thrust-upon exception. 7 The idea of the thrustupon defense is simply this: the defendant will be permitted to
escape liability under the Sherman Act if he can show that he
is either a superior successful competitor or a natural monopolist.
76. The proposition that monopoly is illegal unless economically inevitable
in the sense just described is suggested but not fully articulated in Judge

Hand's opinion. 148 F2d at 429-31. It is also suggested in some of the subsequent cases. R.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery, Corp. 110 F. Supp.
295, 341-45 (D. Mass 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). There
are, however, other interpretations of Judge Hand's opinion that are generally
accepted. For example, Professor Milton Handler of the Columbia University
Law School, in discussing the thrust-upon exception, said:

Because the methods by which the defendants in Alcoa and United
Shoe attained their dominance were not intrinsically unlawful,
some commentators have interpreted these decisions, despite the
explicit disclaimers of their authors, as punishing business success
as such and making it extremely perilous for large concerns to
engage in hard competition. The cases do not go that far. What
they condemn is growth by business methods designed for and
having the effect of impeding new entry or excluding those whose
occupancy is already precarious. It is one thing to compete fairly
and agressively regardless of the consequence to one's rivals; it is
another to surround one's manor with moat and wall to keep out
new competition or to deprive others of fair and reasonable access
to supplies and markets by recognizably exclusionary devices.
Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUm. L. Rav. 930, 934
(1962) (footnotes omitted). This interpretation, which accords with 16 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 8.02[4], at 8-62 n.146 and THE ATTORNEY GENRAu's
NATIONAL COMMITEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 60 (1955),
may or may not be consistent with the analysis proffered above.
77. See generally 16a BUsiNFss ORGANIZATIONS § 9.03[1].
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Although all of the post Alcoa cases recognize the thrust-upon
exception, an analysis of these cases reveals that some courts
78
still adhere to the abuse heritage of Steel and Harvester,
whereas other courts adhere to the power heritage of Alcoa.79
The power cases, generally speaking, interpret Judge Hand's
opinion in a way that corresponds to the above discussion of
Alcoa. The abuse cases, however, interpret Judge Hand's
opinion differently. They distinguish that case on the basis of
its facts, pointing to Alcoa's use of unlawful practices from
1909 to 1912.80 They also emphasize Judge Hand's findings of

exclusionary conduct"' and his statement that Alcoa's monopoly
78. See, e.g., Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of Am., 358 F2d 165,
171 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Winn Avenue Warehouse, Inc., v. Winchester Tobacco Warehouse Co., 339 F.2d 277, 281 (6th
Cir. 1964) ; Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F2d 924, 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955) ; Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking
Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 718 (D. Hawaii 1964); Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill,
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103, 111 (E.D. La. 1964), afj'd per curian, 345 F.2d 79 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); United States v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 217 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 214-17 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S.

377 (1956).

79. See Bergians Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp.
4766 485 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aft'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); United States
v. rinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 246-48, 257 (D.R.I. 1964), affd except as
to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp.
77, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958); United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-45 (D. Mass. 1953),
aft'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 340-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Note 15 supra.
80. Alcoa, which was incorporated in 1888, was able to maintain its monopoly by a series of patents until 1909. From 1909 to 1912 it maintained its position by a series of illegal contracts, which were the subject of a separate
action in 1912. 148 F.2d at 422-23. The importance of this unlawful conduct to
the decision in the Alcoa case is unclear. See 148 F.2d at 430-31. Compare
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 216-17 (D.
Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) wtith 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 8.02[41, at 8-58 n.141.
81. "There were at least one or two abortive attempts to enter the industry,
but 'Alcoa' effectively anticipated and forestalled all competition, and succeeded in holding the field alone." 148 F.2d at 416.
In referring to Judge Hand's statement to the effect that Alcoa was not a
passive beneficiary of monopoly because it had actively sought monopoly by
constantly expanding its capacity to gobble up anticipated increases in demand,
148 F.2d 430-31, the Attorney General's Committee said:
This statement . . . is sometimes misconstrued to suggest that
"monopoly" may become "monopolization" merely by being active,
enterprising, and dynamic. This construction implies that the safest
course for large companies is passive stagnation, with a gradual
loss of market share-a business policy directly at odds with antitrust aims. Such is not the teaching of Alcoa. Defendant's conduct there was held to constitute "monopolization" . . . because it
acted with calculation to head off every attempted entry into the
field. That history of frustrating potential entrants and the vital
fact that no company succeeded in breaking into a basic manufacturing industry, whose technology was widely known, over a period
of more than 25 years, while Alcoa's output increased 800 percent,
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resulted "from a persistent determination to maintain the control, with which it found itself vested in 1912."112 Moreover, and
most importantly, they quote convincingly from Judge Hand's
opinion, statements to the effect that the Sherman Act does
not condemn successful competition. A fortiori, where the defendant's monopoly results from essentially fair methods of
competition, he has not violated section 2.83 But, in Alcoa and
at least one subsequent case, certain conduct, although characterized as fair and honestly industrial, was said to be exclusionary.8 4
The opinions of the Supreme Court appear to espouse a power
philosophy, but this is by no means clear. s5 The most recent
Supreme Court case to deal with monopolization is United States
v. Grinnell Corp.s ( There the Court, speaking generally, said:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
87
accident.
Seemingly this statement is nothing more than a reformulation
of the thrust-upon defense;88 however, the words "willful acquisition or maintenance" may incorporate ideas traditionally
associated with an abuse theory of section 2-that section 2 is not
convinced the court, as a practical matter, that Alcoa's monopoly
position rested on a good deal more than its technical and business
skill.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

NATIONAL COiMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST

LAws, REPORT 60 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
82. 148 F.2d at 430.
83. See, e.g., Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp.
705, 718 (D. Hawaii 1964); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
118 F. Supp. 41, 215-17 (D. Del 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).

84. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See Professor Handler's
comments note 76 supra.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). The Court's
opinion in Griffith and in particular its statement that monopoly power "is
itself a violation of § 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to
exercise that power," Id. at 107, precipitated a great deal of confusion in the
lower courts.

86. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
87. Id. at 570-71.

88. See Handler, Nineteenth Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developinents-1966, 21 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 539, 557 (1966).
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directed against the status of being a monopolist but rather
monopolizing conduct.8 9
The differences between the power and abuse cases may be
more theoretical than actual; the judges often use the same
language and purport to be applying the same rule.90 In reading
these cases, however, one cannot help but sense the existence of
two distinct antitrust philosophies, which, theoretically at least,
are inconsistent, even though they may produce the same result
in a given case.9 1 The power theorist tends to focus on the existence or nonexistence of monopoly power. Like Judge Hand,
he starts with the proposition that monopoly power is an evil
not to be tolerated unless economically inevitable. The abuse
theorist, on the other hand, tends to focus on the defendant's
conduct. If the defendant's methods appear fair and proper
under the circumstances, he is not guilty of monopolization
despite the fact that he possesses monopoly power.
(1) The Power Cases
There are two leading power theory cases: United ,States V.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 92 and United States v. G6innefl
Corp.3 Both opinions were written by a noted advocate of the
89. Although the Court found it unnecessary to reach the position of the
district court that the burden of proving the thrust-upon defense rested with
the defendant, 384 U.S. at 576, the wording of the second element of the
Court's synthesis suggests that the plaintiff must show, as a part of his case,
that the defendant acquired his monopoly by means that do not qualify for the
thrust-upon exception.
90. Compare United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) with Cole v.
Hughes Tool Co., 215 F2d 924 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927

(1955).

91. It is often difficult to determine whether a given case should be classified as an abuse case or a power case. In most of the cases, the courts merely
quote the most recent formulation of the rule by the Supreme Court and purport to apply that rule. In a few cases, the courts will articulate their position, but these cases can usually be reconciled on the basis of their facts and
reasoning. Where the court espouses an abuse theory, the judge will often
find that the defendant's product or service was superior. See, e.g., Clark
Marine Corporation v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103, 111 (E.D. La. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41,
214-17 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). And there is almost always
some abuse present where the court espouses a power theory. "Most monopoly
situations, after all, arise out of acquisition or merger, exclusion or boycott,
or agreement among competitors. The nice question of monopolization by
internal growth rarely occurs." Handler, .rupra note 76, at 934-35 (footnotes
omitted).
92. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass 1953), afd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
93. 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), affd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563

(1966).
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power theory approach, Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., of the
United States District Court of Massachusetts.
In the United Shoe Machinery case, the defendant was a
corporation engaged primarily in the manufacture of machines
used in the production of shoes. In accordance with a longstanding practice in the shoe machinery industry, the defendant
leased but did not sell any of its more important machines; only
its simple machines, which were auxiliary or preparatory to its
more important machines, were available for purchase. The
defendant's leasing agreements were long term and they contained other exclusionary features, such as: a full capacity
clause, which required the lessee to discriminate against competing machines with respect to available work; a return charge,
which made termination expensive and also discriminated
against competing machines with respect to replacement; and a
service provision, which failed to segregate service charges from
rental payments. 94 The court determined that the defendant
supplied over 75 per cent of the American shoe machinery
market and concluded that this dominance constituted a monopoly. Moreover, this monopoly was held to be illegal under
Alcoa9" because it was "not attributable solely 96 to defendant's
ability, economies of scale, research, natural advantages, [or]
adaptation to inevitable economic laws.1 97 Much of the de94. The full capacity clause required the lessee to use United's machines to
full capacity so long as the work was available. In practice, however, this
provision was not considered breached unless the lessee used a competing
machine to perform available work instead of a United machine. 110 F. Supp.
at 320. The return charge in practice was reduced to insignificance, through a
right of deduction fund, if the lessee kept the machine for the duration of the
lease. Id. at 340. Moreover, the lessee was given more favorable terms if he
replaced old United machines with new United machines instead of competing
machines. Id. at 320, 340. United's practice of servicing its machines without
separate charges discouraged the development of an independant service
organization capable of repairing the complicated machines. "In turn, this ...
had the effect that the manufacturer of a complicated machine must either
offer repair service with his machine, or must face the obstacle of marketing
his machine to customers who know that repair service will be difficult to
provide." Id. at 340.
95. The court also said that the evidence satisfied the Griffith rule. Namely,
the use of monopoly power to foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage, or destroy a competitor constitutes a violation of section 2. Here the
defendant possessed monopoly power that had the effect of excluding some
actual and potential competition. 110 F. Supp. at 343.
96. But see United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580 (D.
Conn. 1959) (thrust-upon defense successfully withstood a motion to strike
on the ground that defendant did not allege that his monopoly was due solely
to acceptable causes).
97. 110 F. Supp. at 343.
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fendant's monopoly power was instead attributable to its leasing
system and other miscellaneous activity.9 8
Although the defendant's leasing system and these other
activities 9 were characterized as natural, normal and honestly
industrial, they were held to be exclusionary, because:
they [were] not practices which [could] be properly described as the inevitable consequences of ability, natural
forces, or law. They represent[ed] something more than
the use of accessible resources, the process of invention
and innovation, and the employment of those techniques of employment, financing, production, and distribution, which a competitive society must foster.
They [were] contracts, arrangements, and policies
which, instead of encouraging competition based on
pure merit, further[ed] the dominance of a particular
firm. In this sense, they [were] unnatural barriers; they
unnecessarily exclude[d] actual and potential competition; they restrict[ed] a free market. While the law
allows many enterprises to use such practices, the Sherman Act is now construed by superior courts to forbid
the continuance of effective market control based in
part upon such practices. Those courts hold that market
control is inherently evil and constitutes a violation of
§ 2 unless economically inevitable ....100
98. This other activity included a discriminatory pricing policy as between
different machine types (United fixed a higher rate of return on machine
types facing less competition), the acquisition of patents, purchases in the
secondhand market, and the selling of supplies to shoe manufacturers.
99. The court excepted United's purchases in the secondhand market from
the above characterization.
100. 110 F. Supp. at 344-45. This statement and others suggest that there
are two levels of illegality. First, consistent with Alcoa, the defendant's
monopoly is illegal unless it is economically inevitable in the sense that it
results from superior skill and industry. Second, the defendant's monopoly is
illegal if it results in part from business policies that are not the inevitable
consequences of ability, natural forces, natural advantages, or adaptation to
inevitable economic laws.
This second position finds some support in Alcoa. There Judge Hand said
that it was not inevitable that Alcoa should anticipate increases in demand;
nothing compelled it to do this. Judge Hand made these statements immediately after he said that "[tihe only question is whether [Alcoa] falls within
the exception established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid,
the control of a market." 148 F.2d at 431. Thus, arguably, unless the defendant's conduct was somehow compelled by economic forces or was the inevitable
result of economic forces, he does not qualify for the thrust-upon exception.
Judge Wyzanski apparently reached this conclusion. In discussing the meaning of Alcoa, he said that Judge Hand emphasized that a defendant who
achieves monopoly power by maneuvers not economically inevitable is guilty
of monopolization. 110 F. Supp. at 341.
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The court found United's leasing system, which was one of the
three major sources of its monopoly,1 0 1 particularly objectionable. The court said that the lease-only system contains many
partnership aspects that allow the lessor to establish better
relations with its customers. In particular, United's "leasing
system, especially the service aspect of that system, [gave]
United constant access to shoe manufacturers and their problems.
This... promoted United's knowledge of their problems and...
stimulated United's [research and development]."' 0 2 Moreover,
the lease-only system discouraged the development of a secondary
market, which had two effects: 1) United did not face direct
competition from a secondary market and 2) United's competitors were unable to purchase an old United machine and
copy its unpatented features. Although the court specifically
held that the defendant's leasing system was not unlawful in
markets where United lacked monopoly power, 03 the court
said: "when control of the market has been obtained in large
part by such leases, the market power cannot be said to have
been thrust upon its holder through its own skill, energy, and
initiative, or through technological conditions of production and
distribution, or the inevitable characteristics of the market."'104
The subsequent Grinnell case was a much easier case to decide
on its facts than was United Shoe Machinery. For in that case
the defendants had acquired an 87 per cent share of the national
accredited central station protective service industry by abusive
conduct, including per se violations of section 2. Thus the case
turned primarily on the issue of market definition. Once the
Perhaps these two levels of illegality are simply two ways of saying the

same thing. That is to say, where the defendant's monopoly rests in part upon
business practices that are not the inevitable consequences of his superior

skill, superior product, natural advantages, or economic laws, his monopoly
could not be said to have resulted from the automatic operation of a free

market. This idea is supported by Judge Wyzanski's suggestion that the

defendant's practices, in order to qualify, must represent the type of activity
that "a competitive society must foster:" policies that encourage "competition
based on pure merit." Id. at 344-45. In other words, policies that seek to
achieve business success, not by restricting the market, but by catering to
natural market forces with competitive merit.

101. United's monopoly was attributable to three major sources: 1) the
original constitution of the company (which had been held lawful in former
litigation) 2) the superiority of United's machines and service and 3) United's

leasing system. The court said that the first two sources were above reproach
but not the leasing system.

102. 110 F. Supp. at 323.
103. United had been charged with monopolization of the tanning machinery
market; however, the court found that United lacked monopoly power in this
market. United's tanning machinery leases were like its shoe machinery leases.

104. Id. at 346.
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court defined the market as the national accredited central
station protective industry, liability under section 2 was clear.1 05
But the significance of G6innefl lies, not in its facts,
but in its method. For there Judge Wyzanski, although it
wasn't necessary, rested his decision, on a strict power theory of
section 2. More importantly, he used a power theory approach,
not merely for the sake of craftsmanship, but in a practical
sense by shifting the burden of proof on the issue of the thrustupon exception to the defendant. 101 Under this approach the
defendant is presumed to have monopolized within the meaning
of section 2 upon a showing that he possesses an overwhelming
share of the relevant market. He may rebut this presumption
by showing that his predominant share of the market qualifies
for the thrust-upon exception. Otherwise, he will stand condemned under section 2.107 With respect to proving improper

conduct on the part of the defendant, Judge Wyzanski said:
The Government need not prove, and in a well-conducted trial ought not to be allowed to consume time in
needlessly proving, defendant's predatory tactics, if
any, or defendant's pricing, or production, or selling, or
leasing, or marketing, or financial policies while in this
predominant role. If defendant does wish to go forward, it is free to do so and to maintain the burden of
showing that its eminence is traceable to such highly
respectable causes as superiority in means and methods

....

108

105. Seemingly, the Grinnell case could have been disposed of under the pre-

Alcoa classic test of actual monopolization. Under that test monopoly
achieved by conduct constituting an unlawful restraint under section 1 was
held to constitute monopolization. P. ARMEEA, supra note 32, at 116.

106. In United Shoe Machinery Judge Wyzanski interpreted Alcoa as requiring that the defendant bear the burden of showing that his monopoly was
thrust upon him; however, he did not rest his decision on this position. But
see United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 425-26
(1956) (dissenting opinion). In Grinnell, however, Judge Wyzanski went out
of his way to place the burden on the defendant.

107. 236 F. Supp. at 257. Earlier in the opinion Judge Wyzanski stated the

rule somewhat differently:
[O]nce the Government has borne the burden of proving what is
the relevant market and how predominant a share of that market
defendant has, it follows that there are rebuttable presumptions
that the defendant has monopoly power and has monopolized in
violation of § 2.
Id. at 248. It is not altogether clear, however, to what extent a defendant can
rebutt a presumption of monopoly power once he is clearly shown to possess
an overwhelming share of a properly defined relevant market. See United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
108. 236 F. Supp. at 248.
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On appeal the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach
the question whether the burden of proving the thrust-upon
exception rests with the defendant. Here the record disclosed
that the defendant's consciously acquired their monopoly "in
large part by unlawful and exclusionary practices."10 9

(2) The Abuse Cases
In contrast to the power cases, the abuse cases stress the
necessity of the plaintiff's showing some form of monopolizing
conduct before a case of actual monopolization is made out.
Perhaps the case that best articulates the position of the abuse
theory is United States v. E.I. duPont de Nenwurs c Co. 110 In
that case the Government charged the defendant, duPont, with
inter alia, monopolization of the relevant market, which the
Government contended should be limited to cellophane. During
the relevant time period, duPont produced approximately 75
per cent of the cellophane sold in the United States. The court,
however, using a theory of substitute competition or crosselasticity of demand, defined the relevant market to include
other flexible packaging materials and concluded that duPont
lacked monopoly power in this market. But the Court, in the
course of a lengthy- opinion, went on to discuss the other elements of monopolization.
The question whether the Sherman Act is aimed at conduct or
status was clearly put in issue by the parties:
Defendant contends the offense of monopolization requires, in addition to proof of monopoly power or market control, proof such power or control was achieved
in a manner prohibited by the statute. Plaintiff contends mere possession of the power, no matter how
acquired, in itself establishes a violation. Once power
has been obtained, plaintiff argues, it does not even
have to be exercised. Mere possession of power, it is
argued, is sufficient to constitute offense of monopoli11
zation. '
In rejecting the Government's theory of the Sherman Act, the
court said that the Sherman Act does not prohibit monopoly in
the concrete. By using the verb monopolize, the Act
prohibits conduct rather than status. It is directed
109. 384 U.S. at 576.

110. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. DeL 1953), af!d, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).

111. Id. at 214.
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against activities rather than results. This is not a matter of semantics. It is a matter of facts. That this is so
is obvious from fact the statute carried criminal as well
as civil sanctions. Thus, decisions recognized the manner in which a monopoly position was obtained was a
crucial consideration in determining whether or not a
defendant has monopolized within the meaning of the
Act.
The decisions state a defendant may lawfully obtain
a monopoly position if that position is "thrust upon it".
Thus the right to normal growth and to enjoy the results of technical achievement and successful competi112

tion has been preserved.

The Government, relying on Alcoa, contended that monopoly
must result from circumstances beyond the defendant's control
in order to qualify for the thrust-upon exception. 118 The court
took this contention to mean that the defendant could not "have
done anything to further its own interests" 114 and rejected it as
theoretical. The court then found on the facts that duPont's
dominant position as a producer of cellophane was due to
"research, business skill and competitive activity." 115 Thus, the
court concluded that duPont's dominance was lawful under the
section 2 cases. The court said that the Sherman Act was not
intended to condemn certain competitive activity. This activity,
in addition to skill, foresight, scientific research, new discoveries,
and original entries into new fields or territories, was described
as legitimate means, lawful methods, fair dealings, honest business methods, and legitimate competition.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority of the Court
affirmed the decision of the district court on the ground that
duPont lacked monopoly. Thus, it was not necessary to consider
the other elements of actual monopolization. There was, however, a strong dissent by three members of the Court: Chief
Justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Douglas. The dissenters defined the relevant market differently" 16 and concluded
that duPont did indeed possess monopoly power. They also
112. Id. at 214-15.

113. It is not clear from the opinion whether the Government was contend-

ing that the defendant's monopoly must be economically inevitable in the sense
discussed in this note.
114. 118 F. Supp. at 215.
115. Id. at 217.
116. The dissenters felt that cellophane was a sufficiently distinct packaging
material to constitute the relevant market. 351 U.S. at 414-18.
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said that duPont was guilty of actual monopolization because it
had acquired and maintained its monopoly by a series of agreements that constituted unlawful restraints of trade"1 7 and by
numerous honestly industrial but exclusionary maneuvers. Thus,
the dissenters concluded that "[d]uPont was not 'the passive
beneficiary of a monopoly' within the meaning of [Alcoa].'"" 8
The district court's treatment of the thrust-upon question,
however, can easily be made consistent with the analysis of
Alcoa set forth in this note. That court found that duPont's
dominance as a cellophane producer was primarily the result of
research activity that improved the quality of cellophane and
lowered its cost.119 Thus one might characterize this dominance
as the result of natural economic phenomena-the inevitable
reaction of a free market economy to superior quality and lower
prices. To distinguish the duPont case in this fashion, however,
merely distorts the philosophy of the duPont court, which looked
to conduct and not results. That court did not assert that
thrust-upon monopoly must be the inevitable consequence of
economic phenomena; indeed, it, implicitly at least, rejected this
theory when it rejected the Government's contention that thrustupon monopoly must result "through circumstances beyond
[the defendant's] control."'12 0 Moreover, the court in duPont
interpreted Alcoa narrowly, distinguishing it factually on the
grounds of abusive conduct, actual exclusion of competition, and
a persistent determination on the part of Alcoa to maintain the
control it acquired by unlawful acts.
(3) The Differences and Similarities Between the Power and

Abuse Cases
The duPont court accords with both Alcoa and United Shoe
Machinery with respect to its discussion of superior skill, foresight, and industry. In the area of effective competitive activity,
honest business methods, and the like, however, the differences
and similarities between duPont on the one hand, and Alcoa
and United Shoe Machine" on the other, are uncertain.
In duPont the court listed at least two examples of duPont's
competitive activity which it found acceptable: duPont's pro12 1
gram of creative assistance and its advertising policies.
117. Id. at 418-20, 425-26.
118. Id. at 425.

119. 118 F. Supp. at 217-18.

120. Id. at 215.
121. Id. at 74-82, 218.
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DuPont's program of creative assistance involved working
closely with its actual or potential customers and using its
research to solve their problems with cellophane. Through this
program of creative assistance, duPont was able to improve and
adapt cellophane to fit the needs of particular customers, thereby
developing new uses for cellophane. It developed over 50
different types of cellophane, each designed to satisfy the needs
of certain users and it assisted "customers in the development
of special types of materials."' 22 Its research activities also
"involved creative assistance to manufacturers of packaging
machines, [and] to converters with their printing and other problems .. .123
It improved the overall general quality of cellophane and improved sealing techniques, thus making cellophane
feasible for use on automated packaging machines. It also
participated in the promotion and development of a packaging
machine that could use cellophane as well as other packaging
material.
Presumably, this type of creative assistance is a "[technique]
of . .. production, and distribution, [that] a competitive society
[should] foster;" 1 24 it results in the development of improved

products and greater uses for those products. It is thus inventive
and innovative. There are, however, potential objections to
creative assistance. Creative assistance in itself contains certain
partnership aspects similar to the ones found in the defendant's
leasing system in United Shoe Machirry: it gives the defendant
"constant access to [his customers] and their problems ....
[thereby promoting the defendant's] knowledge of their problems
and [stimulating the defendant's research and development]."1

25

Moreover, a program of creative assistance might easily develop
into an arrangement or policy "which, instead of encouraging
competition based on pure merit, further[s] the dominance of a
particular firm."' 26 For example, one firm might, through an
informal arrangement, place its extensive research staff at the
disposal of its customers on the understanding that they would
not do business with anyone else. In duPont, however, the defendant simply used its research staff to tailor its products to
fit the individual needs of its customers, thereby achieving a
superior product in their eyes.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 218.
Id.
110 F. Supp. at 344.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 345.
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DuPont's advertising policies were also, according to the
court, first rate. "Cellophane was sold to knowledgeable buyers
on the basis of quality performance."'u2 This type of advertising, which is designed to objectively present the relative quality
of the defendant's product, serves a useful purpose in that it
educates the consumer and helps him to make a more intelligent
purchase. Thus, in this sense, it represents a technique of
distribution that a competitive society should foster. Other
types of advertising, however, would be suspect. For this latter
type of advertising, which is usually based on exaggerated
claims or tactics of hidden persuasion, artificially stimulates
demand and thereby tampers with the operation of the market
mechanism. 128 DuPont's advertising, however, merely alerted
its customers to the superior quality of cellophane, which in
turn triggered the market into action.
Because they are expensive, both research and advertising are
inherently exclusionary in the sense that they discourage potential competition from entering a given market.129 Where the
existing firms possess extensive research departments and spend
large sums of money on advertising, the prospective entrant must
be prepared to compete on these terms if he expects to succeed.
Moreover, the firms already there have a head start. The sheer
amount of money required to overcome these barriers to entry
would be enough to discourage most potential entrants and thus
127. 118 F. Supp. at 218.

128. Even the duPont court remotely hinted that a monopoly achieved by
"national advertising and high-pressure tactics fortified with elaborate salesmen's entertainment expenses" would be objectionable. Id.

The term hidden persuasion refers to a technique of advertising whereby the

advertising or product itself is designed to trigger a subconscious buying
response in the buyer. For example, research may reveal that women have a

propensity to buy products that are wrapped in red cellophane. Accordingly,
the defendant's product, which is sold in large super markets, is attractively

packaged in red cellophane. Women shoppers will, if the theory is correct,
prefer the defendant's product over other brands, not because of its quality
but because it is wrapped in red cellophane. See generally, V. PAcKARD, THE
HIDDEN PERSUAERS (1957).

129. A common industrial pattern is that of a firm that has considerable

control over price by virtue of its technological efficiency, its

patents, its trademarks, and its slogans. Its "monopoly profits"
are plowed back into further research and advertising, so that it

is always able to keep abreast or ahead of its rivals. General
Electric, RCA, and Du Pont are perhaps typical of such com-

panies.

Because research and advertising are expensive and their results cummulative, success tends to breed success, and profits tend
to breed more profits. Therefore small business claims that it
cannot always effectively compete with such firms. In other words,

industrial research may be subject to economies of large scale
which small businesses cannot enjoy.
P. SA iuELsoN, EcoNomics 500 (6th ed. 1955) (footnotes omitted).
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perpetuate the monopoly of the existing firm or firms. But
from the standpoint of social advantages, research and certain
kinds of advertising should be encouraged. Under a strict power
theory, however, it is difficult to rationalize the existence of any
monopoly that is the direct result of advertising, especially
where the advertising is excessive or extravagant.
In one case, Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking
Co.,180 the plaintiff specifically relied on a theory of excessive
advertising in a treble damage action brought under section 7
of the Clayton Act and sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act.
The plaintiff, a Hawaiian baker, alleged that the defendant,
"one of the largest baking companies in the United States,"' 81
acquired the leading bakery in Hawaii, Love's Biscuit & Bread
Co. It was alleged that Love's controlled 83 percent of the local
bread market and consequently, that it possessed monopoly
power. It was further alleged that "Love's carried out an
extensive advertising program and . ..introduced 13 new varieties of bread into the Honolulu market, accompanying each
new introduction with expensive advertising" 132 in an effort to
suffocate its competition. The court, although manifesting an
abuse philosophy, held that the complaint stated a claim under
the Sherman Act, apparently on the theory of a conspiracy to
monopolize between Continental and its Hawaiian subsidiary.
The court found that Love's achieved its monopoly position by
virtue of honest industry and seemed to conclude that, for this
reason, there was no actual monopolization. Later the court
said:
If, as pled, these [new varieties] were introduced and
accompanied with excessive advertising costs for the
purpose of destroying competition, and it could be
shown that the costs of such advertising were as extravagant as alleged, i.e., that the defendants' "market
power" was applied, and if there was no factor which
could justify such expenditures as fair economic necessities, then from such facts the proscribed intent to
destroy competition might be found, i.e., a Sherman
Act violation. 83
130. 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964).
131. Id. at 710.
132. Id. at 711.

133. Id. at 720. This statement seems to suggest that the complaint alleged
that the defendants actually exercised their monopoly power in an effort to
destroy competition. Thus, seemingly under United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100 (1948), the complaint stated a claim of actual monopolization as

well as conspiracy to monopolize.
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The case of Cole v. Hughes Tool Co.' 84 demonstrates the actual
or potential differences that exist between the power and abuse
theories in the area of the superior successful competitor. That
case was a consolidation of three separate but identical actions
brought by the plaintiff, the Hughes Tool Co. Hughes was
engaged in the business of manufacturing and leasing rotary
drilling bits. The bits were leased to its customers under formal
agreements that required the lessee to return the bits to Hughes
after it had finished with them. Each defendant was engaged in
a blackmarket retipping operation. They would acquire dull
bits belonging to the plaintiff and retip them so that the bits
could be used again by the plaintiff's customers or by other
drillers. In its complaint, Hughes alleged patent infringement,
conversion, and interference with property and contract rights.
Each defendant counterclaimed alleging, inter alia, actual monopolization. In one of the three actions, Hughes Tool Co. v.
Ford,13 5 the district court found the defendant guilty on all
three of the counts alleged in the complaint, but the court
denied relief on the ground, inter alia, that Hughes was guilty
of actual monopolization. The court, finding that Hughes supplied "approximately 75% of the rotary drilling bits used in
the drilling industry,"'1 6 concluded that this dominance
amounted to a monopoly that was illegal because it resulted
in part from the plaintiff's leasing practice, which, the court
found, was designed to forestall competition. Based on the
evidence, the court concluded that the primary purpose and
effect of the plaintiff's leasing practice was to enable "the
plaintiff to make certain that the majority of [its bits would not
be] repaired and used again in competition with [its] new
bits."'137 Moreover, the court said "that the paramount aim of
the lease agreement as used by the plaintiff was to promote
sales rather than to achieve engineering perfection."'188
In the court of appeals, one judge agreed with the analysis
of the district court; however, the majority of the court held
that the district court's finding of monopoly power and its
conclusions regarding the object of the plaintiff's leasing practice
were clearly erroneous. The majority said the plaintiff's success
was the result of valid patents and the superior quality of its
134. 215 F2d 924 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955).

135. 114 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Okla. 1953), rev'd in part, 215 F.2d 924 (10th

Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955).

136. Id. at 542-43.
137. Id. at 544.

138. Id. at 547.
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bits. This superior quality was the result of the plaintiff's
extensive research program, of which its leasing practice was
an intergal part. By repossessing and testing its worn out bits,
the plaintiff was able to develop better ones. The majority
interpreted United Shoe Machinery to stand for the proposition
that a leasing practice, which results in monopoly power, is
objectionable if it interferes with the right of the lessee to use
the products of a competitor.13 9 Here the plaintiff's leasing
practice did not deter, nor was it "intended to deter, a driller
from acquiring and using bits made by Hughes' competitors;" 1 40

the leases contained no provisions making "it disadvantageous
for the lessee to use the bits of a competitor." 14 ' Speaking generally, the majority said:
One who gains a large portion of a market by manufacturing a better product and by furnishing better
service to his customers, which constitutes legitimate
competition, is not denounced by the Sherman Act.
The maintenance of a research department, the carrying on of intensive research, constant efforts to improve the manufactured products and to render better
service to customers by a manufacturer are not condemned [by the Sherman Act]. That Act does not
condemn business success, arising from quality and per142
formance of a manufacturer's product.
The Hughes case demonstrates the closeness of the questions
that can arise where one competitor is exceedingly successful.
It may be that the differences between the opinions of the
district court and the court of appeals turned on questions of
fact but it seems more likely that the different philosophies of
the two courts produced different results. Both opinions, however, accord with Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery when viewed
separately and in light of the reasoning used by each court. The
court of appeals regarded the plaintiff's dominance as the result
of superior skill, foresight, and industry. The district court, on
the other hand, saw the plaintiff's dominance as the result of
its leasing system, which represented "something more than
the use of accessible resources, the process of invention and innovation, and the employment of those techniques of employment, financing, production, and distribution which a competi139. 215 F.2d at 932-33.
140. Id. at 933.
141. Id.

142. Id. at 938.
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tive society must foster.' 143 Under the reasoning of the court
of appeals, the plaintiff's dominance could be characterized as
the automatic operation of a free market. Under the district
court's reasoning, the plaintiff's dominance could not be said to
be economically inevitable; it was the result of an arrangement
"which, instead of encouraging competition based on pure
1 44
merit, further[ed] the dominance of a particular firm."'
V. SumsTxTiv

A&iYsis

a. In GeneraZ
As previously mentioned the Sherman Act imposes criminal
liability on anyone adjudged to be a monopolist within the
meaning of section 2. Like other crimes, section 2 monopolization
can be formally analyzed on the basis of its definitional elements,
the most important of which are: 1) the definitional harm
2) the definitional intent and 3) the definitional conduct. Of
course, the definitional conduct must coincide with the definitional intent in point of time, causing the definitional harm,
which must be legally proscribed. 145
The definitional harm of section 2 monopolization might
logically be characterized as the existence of monopoly itself,
"the denial to commerce of the supposed protection of competition,"' 46 or some other evil commonly associated with monopoly.
It is clear, however, that the courts will not look beyond the
existence of monopoly power to determine whether the defendant's monopoly is harmful or beneficial. 147 Thus the definitional harm, although not necessarily synonymous with monopoly, is made out when monopoly is shown to exist.
The definitional intent of any given crime can range from a
specific intent, where the prosecution must show a particular
frame of mind, to strict liability (i.e., no intent requirement at
all). The intent requirement of actual monopolization is the
general intent to engage in the conduct that produced the
143. 110 F. Supp. at 344.
144. Id. at 344-45.
145. Note 18 supra.

146. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F2d 416, 428 (2d Cir.
1945).

147. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953); see generally 16a BusrNess ORGANIZATIONS

§ 9.03[3].
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monopoly.1 43 The courts, however, do not require the government to show the defendant's frame of mind as a separate element of its case. Once the defendant is shown to possess monop149
oly power, an intention to monopolize is assumed.
From a theoretical standpoint, the definitional conduct of
any crime has two aspects: one physical and one psychological. 15 0 That is to say, that the definitional conduct must be
manifested by a physical act of volition.' 5 ' Possession can constitute an act, provided that "the possessor knowingly procured
or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control
thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate
his possession."' 5 2 The definitional conduct of section 2 monopolization is associated with the existence of monopoly power. It
is the conduct that causes the definitional harm; more particularly, the conduct by which the defendant acquires, maintains,
or, under a strict power theory, possesses monopoly power.
b. Monopoly power
Monopoly power is indeed the central element of section 2
monopolization. As previously mentioned, once monopoly power
is shown to exist, an intention to monopolize is assumed 153 and
under a strict power theory, liability is complete unless the defendant can show that his monopoly power comes within the
thrust-upon exception.15 4
Monopoly power is defined generally as the power to control
prices or exclude competition in the relevant market, 55 which
is usually defined in terms of a product and a geographic area.
The courts will consider a number of factors in assessing the
1 6
defendant's power in the relevant market (market power)
148. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1947); John Wright &

Associates, Inc. v. Ullrich, 328 F2d 474, 477-79 (8th Cir. 1964); United

States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945); United

States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); 16 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS
§ 8.02[41, at 8-45.

149. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nernours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392

(1956).

150. J. HALL & G.

ed. 1965).

151. But see R.

MUELLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND PRoCEDURE

PER INs, CnIMINAL LAw

103-17 (2d

749 (2d ed. 1969).

152. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
153. Note 149 supra.
154. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), affd
except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
155. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956).
156. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377 (1956) ; See generally P. AR.xA, sutpra note 32, at 71, 127-35.
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the most important of which is the defendant's share of the
relevant market (market share).157

Market share, although an important indication of monopoly
power, is not synonymous with monopoly power. But ordinarily,
market power will be assumed where the defendant possesses a
predominant share of the relevant market. 58 There is no set
percentage of market share that will automatically trigger this
assumption, however. In Alcoa 90 percent of the relevant market
was held to be a monopoly but in the Ha2-vester case 64 percent
was insufficient.
Courts sometimes precisely define the relevant market to fit
the peculiarities of the defendant's product.'5 9 Thus, in such
a case, a finding of monopoly power is almost assured. This
precision in market definition raises the following problem:
should the substantive content of the other definitional elements
be raised to compensate for the tailor-made relevant market?
At least one court has suggested that the answer to this question should be yes. In United States v. Guerlain, Ihw. 16 0 the
court said that a determination of guilt could not be based
solely on a finding of honestly industrial but exclusionary conduct where the relevant market was "defined as the trade-marked
toilet goods of each defendant."' 61
c. Definitional Intent
In Alcoa Judge Hand synthesized the existing case law of
section 2 monopolization around one central theme-the need to
avoid convicting the accidental monopolist who "unwittingly
[finds himself] in possession of a monopoly, automatically ...
without having intended either to put an end to existing competition or prevent competition from arising when none existed .... 1,162 Judge Hand said that since the Sherman Act
makes monopolization a crime, it would be unfair to convict
the inadvertent or unintentional monopolist. Yet, further on in
his opinion Judge Hand said, "We disregard any question of
intent.' 163 Seemingly, if he were concerned with the possibility
157. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
158. Id.

159.
1964),
160.
161.
162.
163.

See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I.
aff'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
Id. at 87.
148 F.2d at 429-30.
Id. at 431.
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of convicting an inadvertent monopolist, his first inquiry would
be whether the defendant intended to monopolize the relevant
market. But Judge Hand saw the problem of the inadvertent
monopolist not from the standpoint of the defendant's subjective
state of mind but rather from the standpoint of the objective
operation of a free market economy. The question was whether
the defendant's monopoly was economically unavoidable, not
whether the defendant unintentionally acquired monopoly power.
The competitor who spends large sums of money in an effort
to develop a superior product does so with the intention of
enlarging his share of the market at the expense of his rivals.
But even if his efforts are successful to the point that he becomes a monopolist, he is not guilty of monopolization, because
his monopoly was the inevitable consequence of his superior
16 4
product. He is an inadvertent monopolist despite his intent.
d. DefiniionaZ Conduot

It is no longer necessary to show that the defendant acquired
or maintained his monopoly by predatory tactics or unlawful
restraints of trade.6 5 Indeed, under a strict power theory all
the Government need show is that the defendant possesses
monopoly power. 66 The defendant, of course, will be allowed
to escape statutory liability if he can show that his monopoly
power was thrust upon him. The abuse cases, presumably, would
require the plaintiff to show, as an element of its case, that
164. Arguably, some of Judge Hand's statements could support a contrary
conclusion, at least where the defendant specifically intended "either to put an
end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when none
existed . . . .. Id. at 429-30. Viewing the opinion as a whole, however, and
considering the nature of competitive activity, the superior successful competitor just described should be immune from liability even though he specifically intended to foreclose competition and successfully used the market as
a means for accomplishing his end. In his discussion of the inadvertent
monopolist, Judge Hand was not concerned with the concept of mens rea.
Rather, his use of terms such as accidental and automatic suggest that he
was more concerned with the volitional aspect of actus rets. In other words,
where the defendant's monopoly is thrust upon him, so to speak, by the
automatic operation of a free market, there is no act of volition on his part
on which to support a finding of criminal liability. Thus, the government's
case must fail regardless of the existence of a specific intent. Moreover, competition, by nature, involves rivalry between contestants each intending to
capture the same thing-the relevant market or as big a slice of that market
as possible. Thus, to condemn a superior successful competitor because he
intended to achieve monopoly would be to condemn competition itself.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), af'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
166. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), affd
except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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the defendant's monopoly power was not thrust upon it.167 The
Supreme Court has declined to say where the burden of proof
should lie. Its most recent reformulation of the rule, however,
suggests that the burden is on the plaintiff to show that68 the
defendant wilfully acquired and maintained its monopoly.
As previously mentioned, most of the confusion in the law of
section 2 monopolization centers around the concept of the
superior successful competitor. Just how far a competitor can
go under the guise of vigorous competition is uncertain. This
subject was dealt with in detail in the historical presentation; it
should be sufficient to point out here that a lot depends on the
philosophy of the court. Some of the cases seem to suggest that
the question should be whether the defendant's conduct constituted an essentially fair method of competition 6 9 or, stated
somewhat differently, whether the defendant's conduct was designed to foreclose competition or had that effect. 7 0 It was
suggested that Judge Hand saw the problem in terms of the
automatic operation of a free market. This view was alluded
to in Alcoa but not fully articulated. It may be that this analysis is no different from the other standards mentioned above.
Or it may be that this analysis reads too much into the words
of Judge Hand.' 71 At the very least, however, it represents a
useful tool from the standpoint of judicial craftsmanship, even
though it may prove inadequate under the facts of a given case.
Moreover, one primary purpose of the Sherman Act was to
protect competition and competition takes place within the
framework of a market. Thus, it makes sense to analyze the
defendant's monopoly position in terms of market behavior.
The term market has been described as "the complex of institutions and processes through which commodities and services
167. See, e.g., Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.
La. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 345 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. dentied, 382 U.S.

1011 (1966).
168. Note 89 supra.

169. See, e.g., Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.

La. 1964), affd per curiam, 345 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1011 (1966).
170. See note 76 supra.
171. Id. In discussing the role of economic theory in antitrust analysis, Professor Areeda raises the following question:
How far must we search for economic truth in a particular case
when the economic facts may be. obscure at best, when the relevant economic theories may be controversial or indefinite, and
when the statute does not give us a clear-cut value choice?

P.

ARaaaA,

supra note 32, at 5.
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are produced, exchanged, and bought for final consumption."'1 7 2
The market is a method for getting things done, namely, the
allocation of resources that are scarce in terms of the number of
potential consumers. The market mechanism itself, which is a
complex interaction of two sets of economic forces commonly
called supply and demand, determines what goods are to be
produced, how much is to be produced, and who is to get that
which is produced.
For purposes of this note, however, a sophisticated economic
analysis of the operation of a free market is unnecessary. For
most, if not all, of the cases can be analyzed simply in terms of
the preference of consumers for lower prices and superior quality. As previously mentioned, where one competitor reduces his
price or improves the quality of his product without raising his
price, the likely result is that more and more business will come
his way. And if his competitors are unable to make corresponding changes in their product or prices, he is likely to end up a
monopolist. But from the standpoint of the Sherman Act, he
should not be adjudged a criminal monopolist because under
these facts, there is no element of direct causation, which is
necessary to support a finding of criminal liability. In other
words, where the defendant's monopoly is the result of a superior
product or service, his business activities that led to the development and introduction of that superior product or service are
not the primary and direct causes of his monopoly. They are,
rather, remote causes. It is the inevitable and automatic reaction
of a free market to the introduction of that superior product or
service that is the primary and direct cause of his monopoly.
cause that
This automatic market reaction is an intervening
173
insulates the defendant from criminal liability.
Under this analysis, the problem in every case would be
essentially one of causation. 7 4 If the court finds that the de172. D. WATsoN, supra note 55, at 42. Professor Watson points out that it
is no longer fashionable in economic circles to speak in terms of natural economic laws. "[Miodern economists use such terms as tendencies, or propensities, or functions, or theories, or relationships. The term 'law' is generally
avoided . . . because . . . [mlost economists hold that generalizations about
economic behavior have a character fundamentally different from those that
explain natural phenomenon." Id. at 49. Terms connoting natural economic
laws have been used in this note in part because the courts have used them
but mostly for convenience.
173. An alternative but related theory would be that the monopoly was
acquired by the defendant without an act of volition on his part. Note 164
su1pra.
174. Causation is used here not in the sense of causation in fact but more
in the sense of proximate causation.
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fendant's monopoly is the direct result of the automatic operation
of a free market, then he escapes liability. If on the other hand,
the court finds that the defendant's monopoly is in part a direct
result of the defendant's own business policies, then he is guilty
of monopolization.
For example, suppose that a defendant is charged with acquiring a monopoly in a particular market by virtue of his
advertising. The problem for the court would be to determine
whether the defendant's advertising is a direct cause of his
monopoly. If his advertising is designed simply to call attention
to the superior quality of his products, then the direct cause of
his monopoly would be the natural reaction of a free market to
that superior quality. But if his advertising relies primarily on
psychological techniques of hidden persuasion,' 75 then the proximity between that advertising and the defendant's possession
of monopoly is increased. If the court finds that the defendant's
advertising is a substantial and direct cause of his monopoly,
then, under the teaching of Alcoa, he should be found guilty of
section 2 monopolization. For, as previously mentioned, Judge
Hand started with the proposition that monopoly is basically
evil and, unless economically inevitable, illegal under section 2.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Based in part on the legislative history of the Sherman Act,
the courts have fashioned an exception to section 2 monopolization that allows certain monopolists to escape liability. This
exception, commonly called the thrust-upon exception, applies
generally to two different types of monopolists: 1) the unintentional monopolist and 2) the competitor who acquires monopoly by virtue of his superior skill and industry. The scope of the
exception as applied to the second type of monopolist is uncertain because of the existence of two theories regarding the
nature of Sherman Act monopolization-the power theory and
the abuse theory.
The differences between these two theories may be more
theoretical than actual. There is, however, at least one actual
difference in the area of burden of proof. Under the power
theory the defendant bears the burden of proving that his
monopoly comes within the thrust-upon exception. Under the
abuse theory, presumably, the plaintiff bears the burden of
175. Note 128 mipra.
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monopoly does not come within the
proving that the defendant's
6
1
thrust-upon exception.

With respect to burden of proof, the position of the power
theory seems to be more in line with the AZcoa opinion. There
Judge Hand, in discussing the question whether the plaintiff
should be required to prove that the defendant charged a
monopolist's price, said:
It may be retorted that it was for the plaintiff to prove
what was the profit upon ingot in accordance with the
general burden of proof. We think not. Having proved
that "Alcoa" had a monopoly of the domestic ingot
market, the plaintiff had gone far enough; if it was an
excuse, that "Alcoa" had not abused its power, it lay
upon "Alcoa" to prove that it had not. But the whole
issue is irrelevant anyway, for it is no excuse for
"monopolizing" a market that the monopoly has not
extract from the consumer more than a
been used to 177
"fair" profit.
Placing the burden of proving the thrust-upon exception on
the defendant would also be in the interest of the sound administration of the Sherman Act. By simplifying the proof process,
it would help reduce the length of monopolization cases, which,
78
like other antitrust cases, are noted for their oppressive length.
And since the cases that call for an application of the thrustupon exception are rare, 179 it seems pointless to require the
plaintiff to go through the motions of showing exclusionary
conduct in every case. Moreover, the defendant is in the best
position to demonstrate his superior skill and industry.
MANTON M. GRuE
176. Note 167 supra. In his case book, Professor Areeda raises the follow-

ing question:
Once sufficient monopolizing behavior has been found to warrant
holding the defendant guilty of monopolization, do the "defenses"
discussed by Judges Hand and Wyzanski have any relevance?
That is, if the defendant has actually behaved unlawfully, can he
escape liability by proving one or more of the "defenses"?
P. AREEDA, supra note 32, at 117-18. Thus, theoretically, the defendant may
bear the burden of proving that he comes within the thrust-upon exception
even under an abuse theory. The plaintiff, however, would be required to
show sufficient monopolizing behavior before any discussion of the thrustupon exception would become relevant (i.e., once the plaintiff shows monopolizing behavior the burden shifts to the defendant), and most, if not all,
monopolizing behavior would preclude the defendant from coming within the
thrust-upon exception.
177. 148 F.2d at 427.
178. See Judge Wyzanski's comments in the Grinnell case. 236 F. Supp. at
247.

179. Id. at 248.
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